Ukraine's model of warfighting faces a serious test in the form of disinterest and incompetence from its supporters.
Against all odds the US averted a government shut down. The cost was minor for the US, but it cost Ukraine $24b in aid. The current deal is a stop-gap measure which runs until mid-November, so Ukraine will almost certainly get aid again later in the year. But it is a tangible demonstration of how perilous it can be to rely on the United States. Does Kyiv’s war effort hinge on US support? No, or at least not to the degree that all is lost because Washington DC cannot get its act together enough to spend money it had planned to spend. That being said, Ukraine is dependent on Western support, and as I’ve argued on the blog before, it is relying on a positive feedback loop of battlefield success to raise the funds, arms, and munitions necessary to continue the fight. Not getting the support makes it harder to make gains on the ground which subsequently makes it harder to get the support needed to continue fighting successfully.
Ukraine has had a diplomatic spat with some of its neighbours over food exports, leading to Poland promising to stop sending weapons to Ukraine, while the winner of Slovakia’s recent election said he would not send a single bullet to Ukraine. In short, the unity that the West and most of Europe exhibited immediately following Russia’s invasion seems to have passed. Ukraine’s supporters are still committed to the fight, but the conflict’s status as something so important as to be above politics has completely disappeared. With autumn comes bad weather, so the Ukrainian counter-offensive is coming to a close in the coming weeks. The positive feedback loop I described earlier is at a real risk of inverting now, with reduced aid potentially stopping Kyiv from pushing as hard and fast as it would have liked to, possibly leading to the counter-offensive being deemed a failure, making the return on investment of more support look worse.
If things continue on the current trajectory, I suspect we’ll start seeing just how big Russia’s advantages in fundamentals like population and economic heft are compared to Ukraine sans outside help. Ukraine is not powerless to stop the trend of losing support, but as I have written about several times this year, it has a lot of image problems, it routinely makes overly aggressive attacks with little strategic or tactical value, and it can to be completely honest act entitled about weapon systems. To fix those issues will be difficult, and some countries will simply not support Kyiv anymore irrespective of Zelensky does, but fixes are possible. Also urgent.
As long as Ukraine is dependent on outside help to win its war it will be vulnerable to outside shocks. It can do more and better to get its supporters to continue supporting it, but no matter what it does it cannot stop the US from engaging in self-destructive parliamentary procedures. Which is why it is so important to make sure not to rely too much on outside help, and especially from one specific actor. Especially one with politics as volatile as the US.
If you liked this post you can read my last post about Russian power here, or the rest of my writings here. It'd mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!
I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.
Written by Karl Johansson
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