Like many others my predictions about the war in Ukraine has frequently been wrong. What did I overlook?
As we approach the end of the year I have been thinking back on the major events of 2022. No doubt the most consequential event of the year was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While I did correctly predict that Russia would attack, I was quite wrong on the scale of the war. I thought the obvious play from Putin was to push in the east of Ukraine, but instead he decided to try to take Kyiv. I was also very wrong on how the conflict has turned out. Like many commentators I have consistently underestimated Ukraine’s chances and overestimated Russia’s army. I think those two biases are distinct and separate, and this week I want to try to understand why I have been so consistently wrong about the capabilities on both sides. Hopefully explaining where I went wrong helps you understand the conflict better.
I think the reason why I thought Ukraine would not do well were that it has both a resource disadvantage, an operational history disadvantage, and the disadvantage of being the defender. Let us tackle what I mean by each disadvantage and why it did not apply the way I thought it would. Firstly, the fact is that Russia is a much larger country than Ukraine, and while neither state is at the bleeding edge of technology nor have world-class economies Russia is still bigger and richer which should generally be an advantage in any conflict. The problem with this line of reasoning is how committed the West has been to supply Ukraine with weapons and other military kit, free of charge. If the conflict were strictly between Moscow and Kyiv with no outside interference on either side, I suspect it would benefit Russia, but of course it was a mistake not to factor in US support for Ukraine. Secondly, Russia has fought a greater number of wars since the dissolution of the Soviet Union than Ukraine, which I thought would mean that the Russian army had more real-life experience than the Ukrainian army. The flip side of that though, is that it means that there are records of how the Russian army operates which the Ukrainians no doubt studied and incorporated to their defence plan. Finally, based on conflicts like the campaign against ISIS, the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, and the gulf war I thought a 21st century war was generally aggressor sided. This one is a clear case of sample bias, as I am sure there are examples of relatively recent wars in which the defender won. My failure to understand how well the Ukrainians would do then, was rooted in a failure to consider all the factors, and not considering second order effects.
My failure to understand how poorly the Russian army would do on the other hand is rooted in a misplaced assumption of general competency in armies and a failure to understand how deeply Putin’s regime of corruption and institutional decay has harmed the Russian military. Firstly, I think it is worth comparing the Russian army to the American army in terms of track record to illustrate the point I’m about to make. The US won WWII, had basically a draw in Korea, lost in Vietnam, won in the first Gulf war, technically a win in Iraq but quite the mixed bag, and a loss in Afghanistan. Hardly an impressive track record for arguably the most powerful army in history. Is it reasonable to expect the Russian army to do any better? I don’t think so. Not because the Russian’s are inherently worse than the Americans, but because most armies fail to enforce most of their state’s war aims most of the time. The Russians are no different, and the mistake I made when thinking about the Russian army was to assume that armies are generally competent. Secondly, given the rumours about how incredibly poorly planned and executed the initial stages of the war were from Russia’s side it seems to me that Putin’s rule has hollowed out Russian military institutions, to the extent that there were strong institutions there before he took power.
All in all, I made plenty of errors when thinking about the war. The biggest thing I got right was that it would happen, and I suspect that it will continue for all of 2023 as well. Let us hope that is something I got wrong too.
If you liked this post you can read a previous post about the EU's price cap on Russian oil here or the rest of my writings here. It would mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!
I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.
Written by Karl Johansson
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