Many western commentators seemed chocked that Putin decided to declare war on Ukraine, and the emerging consensus is that the move was either a strategic mistake due to a miscalculation or an irrational crime of passion. I disagree.
The constant question I’ve heard asked lately is: why? Why did Putin decide to invade Ukraine? Last week’s episode of Rational Security, a US-based podcast about US national security, the hosts discussed whether or not Putin is mentally stable a couple of days before the attack. Jacob Shapiro and Marco Papić agree on the latest episode of the Perch Pod podcast that the attack was a strategic blunder on a monumental scale. On a recent Economist webinar about the war the discussion touched on how much of Ukraine Russia could occupy assuming that the Russians aim for a similar ratio of military and security forces to civilians as what the US had in Iraq. While I respect all of these people (and they’re probably more knowledgeable than I so take my views with a grain of salt) I think they misunderstand what the Russians are trying to achieve with the invasion, and that they take a narrow view of the strategic calculus which compelled Russia to attack. Before I can explain why Putin attacked, and what he wants out of the conflict I have to describe the assumptions I have made to reach these conclusions.
First assumption: Russia doesn’t have a specific goal for the invasion
This might sound ridiculous, after all the Russians are clearly pushing for Kyiv. But what I mean isn’t the military targets but the political aims of the attack; war is after all just politics by other means. I don’t think Putin’s regime is married to a specific resolution to the war, which gives Russia the flexibility of choosing what victory looks like. The stated casus belli is “denazification” but from what I’ve read there is no large scale nazi movement in Ukraine; as you would expect, I highly doubt naziism is a popular ideology in Ukraine given its history. This means that denazification can’t really fail, to use an analogy: the easiest new year's resolution for a non-smoker is quitting smoking. More concrete goals like taking Kyiv or regime change also makes it easier for third parties to judge how well the different sides of the war are doing, but “denazification” lets the Kremlin shrug off criticism of the campaign’s effectiveness and decide when it has reached its goals. Also by choosing a nominal goal that can’t fail, Moscow can declare victory no matter how the facts on the ground look and no matter how long the conflict has been ongoing.
Second assumption: This isn’t just about Ukraine
As I mentioned earlier, I have seen several commentators bring up how it would be an almost Sisyphean task for Russia to occupy Ukraine. Ukraine is a big country with a sizeable military and a large population which makes occupying it a challenge. Furthermore, Ukrainians don’t seem to want to be a part of Russia which creates further problems for an occupying force. As I wrote in my predictions for the year, I don’t think Russia wants to annex Ukraine; even if the Ukranians would surrender unconditionally tomorrow I would be shocked if Russia were to annex Ukraine. Instead, the war is partly about making sure Ukraine doesn’t join NATO, and partly about sending the message that Russia doesn’t make idle threats.
Final assumption: Russia is thinking strategically
A common thing you’ll hear western commentators say about Putin is that he’s a tactical mastermind but a poor strategist. This view was particularly common during the first half of Donald Trump’s presidency when I heard several American commentators make that very case in the context of Russian interference in the US 2016 presidential election. The argument went that interfering in 2016 was a brilliant tactical move as it helped Trump secure an electoral victory which hurt the US by having generally incompetent leadership for four years, by having Trump and his political allies push for counterproductive policies, and by undermining the US’ credibility as a reliable international parter. But that was all temporary, and in the long term Putin had really made the US more hostile towards Russia; essentially Putin made short term gains in exchange for long term losses. In 2022 though, that reading of events doesn’t really hold up in my view. Given how weak the US’ response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was, I don't see 2016 as a major turn for the worse in Russo-American relations; at least in ways that matter greatly to Russia. Now obviously, the fact that the imagined long term drawbacks to Russia’s actions didn’t materialise doesn’t mean that it wasn’t a strategic mistake, but I digress. The point here is I do see the strategic rationale for a Russian invasion of Ukraine, and even if I didn’t see it personally it’s better to assume that states are acting rationally if one seeks to understand why a country is doing something; saying "Putin's crazy" is an intellectual cop out, from which one learns nothing.
So with these three assumptions in mind: Russia doesn’t have a specific goal for the war, the war isn’t all about Ukraine, and Russia is thinking strategically, what can we infer about why Putin decided to go ahead with the invasion? I believe, and I could be completely wrong here of course, that Russia wants to make sure it is perceived as a threat. Putin could probably have gotten what he wanted from Ukraine (by which I mean a neutral Ukraine which officially admits it won’t join NATO) by negotiating instead of invading, which almost guarantees that Putin can get a deal just as good (and probably a lot better) if the invasion is going Russia’s way. There’s also a broader strategic rationale for the war. If Russia keeps making threats and never has to follow through on them for whatever reason, eventually the threatened party might think Russia is all talk. And the faster Russia is able to overpower Ukraine the more threatening it will seem to Russia’s near abroad, and that reputation will last for years or decades. In a strange way the anti-war protests in Russia could end up benefiting Putin. As I’ve said, I’m convinced Russia won’t annex or occupy Ukraine so I suspect Putin is angling for a diplomatic solution. Russia could surround Kyiv and Kharkiv and control a large section east of the Dnieper river and enter negotiations where Putin says he would push all the way to the Slovakian border if it weren’t for those pesky anti-war protestors. In a fell swoop he gets to seem all the more threatening without any of the work.Western media thinks Russia has ruined its diplomatic reputation but I’m not sure that’s true. It may no longer be seen as a constructive partner to the west, but a bad reputation is not necessarily bad for Russia. To quote Machiavelli:
"And here comes in the question whether it is better to be loved rather than feared, or feared rather than loved. It might perhaps be answered that we should wish to be both; but since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.”
Putin has made his choice. It could have been the wrong choice but I don't believe it was an irrational choice.
If you liked this post you can read a previous post about why Sweden shouldn't join NATO here, or the rest of my writings here. It'd mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!
I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.
Written by Karl Johansson
Sources:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6A9yh15vbrM [A cut down version of The Economist webinar about the war was uploaded to youtube, but the whole webinar is only available to subscribers]
Cover photo by asim alnamat from Pexels, edited by Karl Johansson
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