With just over half of 2024 having passed how are things looking for Ukraine?
Ukraine is holding against Russian attacks and the fear of a total collapse of the Ukrainian front had vanished after American cash and arms are flowing again. I personally came out swinging in my 2024 predictions saying that the war is going to end by the end of the year, and that is looking less and less likely as the front remains broadly stable. But I think that my thesis is still in play for the following reasons:
1. The Western press is losing interest. All throughout the first two years of the war news outlets across the west treated Zelensky as a modern-day Churchill whose singular leadership skills prevented Ukraine from losing. There was a time when Zelensky got the sort of standing ovations expected at Cannes when he spoke to parliaments, and he was in the news urging the US and its allies to give him the next crucial weapon system every other week. Now he is rarely applauded and rarely are his pleas granted.
2. Russia is more powerful than leaders in the West understand. Putin’s regime has been rocked by massive protests, a treasonous army, massive economic sanctions, and tens of thousands of deaths and the battlefield - any one of which would bring down most countries - and manages to continue to advance in the war and exert influence over neighbours like Georgia. If the war comes down to who breaks first, the west or Russia my money is on the west.
3. Cumulative war fatigue. Russia does not get a lot of big wins, but it gets plenty of small wins. Successes like taking Bakhmut and Aadiivka have been pyrrhic victories, but Russia has been very successful in wearing down Ukraine’s capacities in a few key areas like air defences, mine clearing, and both energy production and distribution. These may not have a big battlefield impact now, but come winter Ukraine will struggle to produce enough heating and come next spring it will struggle to get through Russian defences if there is another counter-offensive.
I’ve been writing about the war for almost two and a half years now and the most common and consistent mistake analysts and pundits make is to expect trends to continue linearly. I think this particularly applies to reason number three, as blackouts are more painful in bad weather and when sustained over long periods of time. The fact that things work now does not necessarily imply that they will continue to do so in the future, and likewise the fact that Ukrainians largely want to continue the war now does not necessarily imply that they will continue to do so. If Trump wins the American election I expect both regular people and key decision makers in Ukraine to start to question if a four year interval when America will not support it is worth enduring simply for the possibility that the president in 2029 will resume support.
The future is never written in stone, and perhaps I am simply expecting the trend of tactical defeats for Ukraine to continue linearly. We will see, but as always, I am not very sanguine about Ukraine’s chances.
If you liked this post you can read a previous post about the American election here or the rest of my writings here. It'd mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!
I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.
Written by Karl Johansson
Cover photo by Kostiantyn Stupak from Pexels, edited by Karl Johansson
Comments