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Skribentens bildKarl Johansson

The Sino-American Cold War, or Lack Thereof

Why there isn’t a new cold war brewing, and why that framing causes problems.



The idea of a cold war was always a bit suspect. In Europe the war may have been cold, but in other parts of the world like Afghanistan, Vietnam, and on the Korean peninsula the war was quite hot. Despite the inaccuracy of the term cold war, it’s a very useful shorthand for the geopolitical situation in the latter half of the 1900’s. Anyone born in the mid seventies or earlier has first-hand recollection of the cold war and its quirks like nuclear war drills or arms control negotiations and proxy wars in the news. So it makes sense for the cold war framework to be top of mind for people when thinking about international relations. A communist state in the east versus a capitalist state in the west; the parallels are there. I would argue though, that the idea that the 2000’s will be defined by a Sino-American cold war is not just a misunderstanding of the current geopolitical landscape, it will lead to poor decision making strategically, economically, and could lead to hostilities sabotaging the global effort to save the climate.


The cold war was more than just a rivalry between two great powers, the ideological conflict was central to the cold war, as was the fact that almost every other major global player was devastated by the second world war which made the USA and the USSR not just the two most powerful great powers but functionally the only two great powers. The supposed Sino-American cold war lacks both of those defining features of the cold war. The Chinese Communist Party is confident in its ideology, but it doesn’t try to export it with the fervor of the Soviet Union nor does it inspire Westerners to defect to China; as far as I know there are no communist guerillas fighting to establish a regime based on communism with Chinese characteristics in Africa or South America. The other and more pressing difference between the cold war and the current situation is that there are more than two great powers, the current military build-up on Ukraine’s border is irrefutable evidence that Russia is a great power which is willing to use force to protect its sphere of influence whether or not the EU and the US recognises Ukraine and Belarus as such.


This is where the aforementioned risks of the ‘New Cold War’ framing creates problems. By only focusing on what China and America will do leaves space open for other great and regional powers with revisionist designs to act however they like. Worse, it could lead America to adopt a strategy of appeasement with regards to great and regional powers to not be distracted from the conflict with China. Why not let Russia have Ukraine if Moscow joins America against China? Let Turkey have parts of northwestern Syria and let them have their way in Libya if they stop dealing with China. Or forgive Indian Prime Minister Modi’s various indiscretions in Kashmir and the way he enables Hindu extremists as long as India joins the anti-China camp. Furthermore, how can you justify cooperating with a state which is not just a rival or an enemy but the rival and the enemy?


To solve problems the first step is to diagnose the issue. For America the issue is clear: in a state of zero-sum competition for power in the international system the rise of China necessarily means a decline for America, in relative terms. The response though is not clear. The historical parallel with an eastern communist rival is clear, so adopting the idea of a Sino-America new cold war is the easiest option, and most of America’s political and military leaders are old enough to remember the cold war. The specter of total nuclear war is hardly comforting, but strategies, doctrines, and policies were developed to deal with it, and even cold warriors are comforted by familiarity. But focusing on China greatly increases the risk of a ‘Thucidides trap’; the idea that the cause for war between a rising power and a dominant power is the fear of being overtaken the rising power inflicts on the dominant power. The concept of the Thucidides trap comes from ancient Greek historian Thucidides who described the conflict between Sparta and Athens over control of the Aegean sea and Greece, and the conflict maps fairly well over the cold war in that both feature dominant power feeling threatened by a rising power in an international system with just two great powers. The moral of Thucidides’ tale is clear: “it was the rise of Athens and the fear this inspired in Sparta which made war inevitable”. By making China America’s number one focus and enemy, America creates the fear which could make conflict if not inevitable, at least far more likely.




If you liked this post you can read my last post about 2022 predictions here, or the rest of my writings here. It'd mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!

 

I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.



Written by Karl Johansson

 

Cover Photo by Karolina Grabowska from Pexels, edited by Karl Johansson

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