Is partial mobilisation a sign of complete desperation in Moscow?
Last week Russian president Vladimir Putin decided to officially announce partial mobilisation of the country’s reservists. What does it mean for the war in Ukraine, and is it a sign of weakness from Russia?
Russia has decided to dedicate a lot more manpower to the war in Ukraine and the standard take across Western press is that it’s an undeniable sign of desperation from Putin and the Kremlin. There would obviously be no need for more soldiers if the war was going Russia’s way, or so the thinking goes. As per usual though, I’m more cautious than most in my assessment of the war. I would argue that the mobilisation gives Russia a battlefield advantage over Ukraine as soon as the Russian reservists make it to the frontlines, and while things are going well for the Ukrainians at the moment we shouldn’t discount Russia’s ability to turn things around. Russia has always had the advantage in terms of resources and calling up reservists shows that it is willing to make use of that fact. Just like the US in Afghanistan and Iraq Russia has what it takes to win its war, the question has never been whether Russia has enough men and enough guns to win the war the question has been whether it was important enough for Moscow to win for it to use all it has at its disposal.
The decision to mobilise has clearly not been popular in Russia. There are reports of young men trying desperately to flee the country so as not to have to fight; and of protests against the mobilisation. Does this make Russia’s resource advantages irrelevant? I don’t necessarily think so. War is very seldom popular yet countries still choose to fight, and given that the war in Ukraine has only been going since February I think any proclamation that the Russian people’s fighting spirit has been broken is premature. The US fought unpopular wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam for years before public opinion forced it to abandon those conflicts, and while the opposition to the war in Russia is far more intense than the US’ 21st century wars I still think the pressure is manageable for the Kremlin. Having to mobilise reserves is clearly a sign that Russia’s armed forces were weaker than they thought they would be compared to the Ukrainians, but I doubt it’s a sign that the Russian federation is coming apart at the seams.
Obviously I hope I’m wrong here. I want the Ukrainians to win, but seeing an overwhelming consensus in the press declaring the conflict a massive failure for Putin, and that it’s almost inevitable for Kyiv to win triggers a gut reaction to take the other side in me. War is tricky and dangerous business and as we’ve seen with the Ukrainian push for Cherson reversals do happen. Just because we want Ukraine to win doesn’t mean that we should ignore the factors favouring Russia. Russia has upped the ante, and while nothing is certain I doubt Putin would do so if he thought he had a hand he couldn’t win.
If you liked this post you can read a previous post about the political movement I call Nativism here or the rest of my writings here. It would mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!
I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.
Written by Karl Johansson
Commentaires