Is it NATO’s time to shine? Or is the alliance in a deepening downwards spiral?
Without question, the defining event of 2022 was the Russian attack on Ukraine. Much hay has been made about how NATO has finally gotten its act together. Commentators across the West kept saying things like: “Germany is finally waking up and realising that it has to take some responsibility for the security of Europe”. And: “Putin’s war in Ukraine has ironically strengthened NATO rather than weakening it by showing that Russia is still a threat to European security”. The consensus seems to be that now is NATO’s time to shine. Needless to say I disagree with the premise of these types of optimistic takes on European security and NATO. I’m an outspoken NATO critic and have written in the past about why I don’t think Sweden should join the alliance. This week I want to take a broader perspective and explain why I think the NATO alliance is not just a distraction for Swedish foreign and defence policy, but also an institution which is becoming less relevant by the day. Far from the war in Ukraine being a tragedy which brings the alliance back together, I think it is playing and active part in making the alliance fall apart faster. Time is running out for NATO.
The main point of any mutual security alliance is to deter aggressors. If you have a team of smaller states with a common enemy it makes perfect sense to form an alliance to deter the common threat, but as I’ve argued before NATO has no common enemy. For the states around the Baltic and the Black Sea Russia is the immediate and serious security threat which warrants an alliance like NATO but most NATO states face no realistic threat from Russia. Back when the alliance was formed in the late 1940’s the Soviet Union could pose a military threat to western Europe but the idea that France or Italy would be threatened by Russia today is laughable. To be clear, this would still be true even if Russia were not tied up in the war in Ukraine; in fact even if Russia were to successfully annex all of Ukraine I still don’t think some of the most important NATO members like France and the UK would be realistically threatened by Russia to the point where it makes sense to be in an explicitly anti-Russia alliance. You might wonder why the realpolitik matters. After all, article five of NATO famously makes it so an attack on one member is an attack on all members and that it necessitates a response by law from all members. My assumption and belief is that states will put their own security interests above their treaty responsibilities, and as such most NATO members would only come to their ally’s aid fully if it was in their own interest to do so.
Aside from the issue of whether a treaty is sufficient to ensure that an ally will honour their obligations, I think NATO is on an inevitable downward spiral which the war in Ukraine has sped up. One of the central concepts in international relations theory is the ‘security dilemma’, which is taught at any introduction to international relations course. The security dilemma is an involuntary escalating spiral between two states caused by one of them increasing their stockpile of arms. Because you can never truly no another state’s intentions, and because there are no exclusively defensive weapons an increase in one party’s weapons stockpile can look like a preparation for an aggressive war to the other party. The other state then has to prepare so that on the off chance that its neighbour is planning an attack it is ready. This is then seen by the first state as the second state possibly preparing for an aggressive war, and the vicious cycle continues. Applying the logic from the security dilemma to Europe in 2023 we see that Russia has launched an aggressive war which makes states across the continent realise that they are not currently equipped to defend themselves and thus require new military equipment. But when Germany “wakes up” it buys tanks, howitzers, and fighter jets to defend itself, which are the exact weapons platforms Russia is using to invade Ukraine. Can you blame the Czechs, Danes, Poles, and Belgians for being nervous in that scenario? The security dilemma predicts a chain reaction of states arming themselves and thus raising tensions and undermining trust throughout Europe. A strong Germany is in theory good for NATO as it adds to the deterrent factor, and is better able to help in case of an attack. In actuality though, I think it will sow division between the member states and create a less stable Europe.
Ultimately, it is impossible to know how solid an alliance is until it has been tested. NATO may still turn out to stick together and help each other when the chips are down. It can also turn out to have been a bluff. Only time will tell, but I for one don’t think time is on NATO’s side.
If you liked this post you can read a previous post about American politics here or the rest of my writings here. It would mean a lot to me if you recommended the blog to a friend or coworker. Come back next Monday for a new post!
I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.
Written by Karl Johansson
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