Can Trump pull an inverse Nixon and get Russia to turn on China?
With the war in Ukraine having lasted for over a thousand days, the pessimism in the West is palpable. The latest glimmer of hope has been Joe Biden’s blessing to use long range American missiles against targets in Russia, but if history is any guide the effect will be limited and a new ‘saviour’ weapon system will emerge as the one thing Zelensky needs to free the Donbass. With Trump waiting to take back the White House early next year Biden’s sudden shift on long range missiles looks a lot like a craven attempt to undermine the next administration. Indeed, Washington and European capitals all seem to think that a historic turn in the US’ policy towards Kyiv is in the cards.
The mental model for the war in Ukraine is in the West often assumed to be the German-Czechoslovak war in 1938, or at least the pop-history post-hoc summary of that conflict. The idea is that like Germany in 1938 Russia in 2024 is an expansionist power for which the world is not enough. The attack is the start of a new normal where the expansionist power will lash out at its neighbours one after another in the relentless pursuit of more territory. Giving Putin “what he wants” will in this view not work, because his appetite will not be sated by the Donbass, it will only grow.
That view leaves no room for negotiation because Russia will not be negotiating in good faith. But it is far from clear that Russia is hell bent on war against the Western world. Indeed, I think we can trust Putin when he says that he does not want NATO on his doorstep. I find it fascinating that the US can be so stuck in its idealised world that it misses the parallel between Ukraine and Cuba. The most dangerous moment in the Cold War was most likely when the Soviets wanted to station nuclear weapons on Cuba, which the US found unacceptable, triggering the Cuban missile crisis. We do not have to be Putin fans to realise that having an adversarial power station nuclear weapons in a country neighbouring yours is bound to make one uncomfortable.
Another standard, and incorrect, view in the West is that there is a new Cold War brewing between the US and China. Which when coupled with the default view on Russia presents clear policy avenue for a new administration which is tough on China and conciliatory towards Russia, while not particularly concerned with Ukraine. What if Trump were to imitate the previous American president he is most often compared to (Richard Nixon) and go to Russia?
If we accept the premise that the 21st century will be defined by a superpower struggle between China and America it would make some sense for Trump to try to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. Long time readers of the blog will know that I emphatically do not accept that premise, as I’ve written about previously. But no one from the state department has asked for my opinion, so there is very much still a chance that Trump could try to go to Russia. After all, it is a grand gesture where he gets to attend a high level summit with a leader he respects, make big decisions, and dominate the media cycle. Just the kind of thing he likes.
However, détente is a game for two and the US would have to give Russia something in return for breaking with Beijing. Given that Russia is currently winning in Ukraine, giving it the Donbass and Crimea will not be enough. And sanctions relief will not be enough either, as Russia will not want to go back to an economic model which gives the US leverage over it. So is there anything the US could give Russia to get it onboard an anti-China alliance? Probably not. What Russia wants is its traditional sphere of influence to be respected, meaning eastern Europe and central Asia, recognition as the Great Power it is, and a way to stabilise its economy which has supply -side constraints which is pushing up inflation. The US will inevitably sell out Ukraine, but it will probably not sell out other eastern European states as that would be publicly admitting that NATO is kaput.
I would not be especially surprised if Trump tried to go to Russia, but I think Putin’s price will ultimately prove too high for the US. The audience at home will hate the effort and frame it as a repeat of the Munich agreement, while the Russians will demand being treated as an equal Great Power, which the tunnel vision focus on China prevents. A more skilled statesman with a better selection of top diplomats might be able to conclude such an agreement; but then again a more skilled statesman would see through the conventional narratives and realise the world is multi-polar.
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I've always been interested in politics, economics, and the interplay between. The blog is a place for me to explore different ideas and concepts relating to economics or politics, be that national or international. The goal for the blog is to make you think; to provide new perspectives.
Written by Karl Johansson
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